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Data protection: multi-application smart cards:
the use of global unique identifiers for cross-
profiling purposes – Part I
1
Ewout Keuleers and Jean-Marc Dinant, University of Namur (Belgium) 
This article, consisting of three parts, will
comment on how the opportunities offered by
multi-application smart card schemes can be
reconciled with data protection requirements. In
the first part, the focus will be on the regulatory
framework of the smart card manufacturer and
the legal requirements to develop less privacy-
killing technologies. Hereafter, some technical
solutions will be proposed to demonstrate that
multi-application smart card technology can be
reconciled with the principles of personal data
protection legislation. In the third and final part,
the communication of personal data through
electronic communications networks will be
analysed. In relation hereto, it must be indicated
that intelligent servers will become increasingly
important to assure the interoperability between
different application providers and different smart
card schemes. 
A. Introduction
Multi-application smart cards are becoming more
and more common. In order to take benefit from
the opportunities offered by multi-application
smart card schemes, e.g., the more efficient
provision of services or the generation of value-
added information, authorities at different tiers are
considering, or are underway, to implement local
and national smart card schemes. However, from a
privacy point of view, the use of such “universal"
cards, incorporating various applications, e.g.,
financial, e-ID,2 public transport, library, leisure,
loyalty schemes etc., is not without concerns. 
Based upon the personal data collected and
processed via this single card, application
providers or the card issuer can make a detailed
cross-profile of each card holder. Although cross-
profiling is not unlawful by definition and an
analysis of the collected data can be legitimate, it
is clear that such technologies can also be used for
other purposes. To avoid the creation of George
Orwell’s 1984 Big Brother, the implementation and
exploitation of multi-application smart card
schemes must respond to some basic preliminary
requirements. In particular, attention must be paid
to the use of so-called global unique identifiers
(GUI). To facilitate the cross-profiling of card
holders, i.e., data subjects, application providers
are keen to use a unique identifier, e.g., the smart
card serial number, to identify the same card
holder in different scheme applications.
B. The multi-application smart
card scheme
A mono-application smart card scheme is a fairly
simple one, consisting of one single linear
relationship, e.g., between a customer and his
bank. In such a scheme, there is no interaction
with applications other than those of the
application provider, e.g., the card holder’s
financial institution.3 In this hypothesis, it would
be more difficult to make a cross-profile of the
card holder, because no common identifier is used
in the different databases of each application
provider. For this reason, it will be more difficult
to connect the different databases and make a
profile of a data subject.
In contrast herewith, the architecture and the
underlying privacy issues of multi-application
smart card schemes are more complex. Not only
should one assess the individual role of each actor
involved, e.g., as a data controller or data
processor, but proper attention must also be paid
to the inherent risk of cross-profiling. In order to
facilitate the provision of certain services or to
create value-added information, the smart-card-
embedded application providers will share their
data, e.g., by transferring them to a central data
warehouse. 
Although multiple examples can be given of a
justifiable application of cross-profiling, it is
evident that such architectures can be used for less
legitimate, even illegal purposes. Therefore, proper
attention has to be paid to legal principles in the
field of personal data protection,4 notably to the
responsibilities of each actor and to the use of
global unique identifiers (GUI).5 
The implementation of global unique
identifiers in various communication devices, or in








substantial parts of it, is becoming a major privacy
concern.6 An eloquent illustration of the use of
global unique identifiers is the Ipv6 protocol.7 In
this protocol a field of six bytes is foreseen within
the new IP address for identifying the
telecommunication terminal. By default, it seems
that many Ipv6 stacks will systematically copy this
serial number. As a concrete result and by side
effect, the Ipv6 address will contain a “super
cookie”, tracking and following the user
throughout every Internet communication.
Furthermore and in contrast with a permanent
cookie, this ID may be used not only in the HTTP
protocol, but also in other protocols such as FTP,
NNTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP3, etc. 
The International Working Group on Data
Protection in Telecommunications concluded that
the characteristics of Ipv6 imply certain privacy
risks. “In particular, there are profiling issues at
stake whenever a unique identifier is integrated in
the IP address of each electronic communication
device of the user. In such a case, all
communications of the user can be linked together,
in fact much more easily than by using cookies.”8
As with low-cost radio-frequency identification
(RFID) tags,9 a unique card identifier is certainly
very convenient for smart card manufacturers,
notably, for security and product quality reasons,
e.g., to investigate dysfunctions in the production
line. Nevertheless, a side effect is that unique
identifiers may, are and will be used as a “tracking
identifier” by other persons than the product
manufacturer.10
It appears that almost every smart card has such
a built-in identifier, e.g., the Smart card Serial
Number (SSN). Moreover, every application
provider in the multi-application smart card scheme
is easily able to access and read it. In consequence,
there is an eminent risk that this SSN becomes the
key to analyse each card holder’s behaviour,11
permitting a particular entity or even each
application provider to have a detailed overview of
the transactions made by one of its customers.
C. Legal framework for the smart
card manufacturer: towards a
less privacy-killing solution? 
Although application providers may express their
intent not to use the SSN for cross-profiling
purposes, from a security perspective such a
declaration of intent is not satisfactory. For this
reason smart card technology has to be developed in
such a way that the rerouting of the initial purposes
to, e.g., cross-profiling purposes, is technically not
feasible or is subject to certain constraints.12
In relation hereto, reference can be made to a
recommendation by the Data protection Working
Party. In its opinion 7/2000 of 2 November 2000, it
is stated that:
The design and selection of data processing
technologies, including hardware and software,
shall conform to the objective of processing no or
as less personal data as possible and shall
facilitate the exercise of the data subject’s rights.
Where possible and not disproportionate with a
view to the protection intended, anonymous and
pseudonymous data should be used.13
For this reason, the main focus will be on the
smart card manufacturer, in order to see to what
extent the applicable data protection legislation
can have an impact on the development of less
privacy-killing technology.
1. The application of Directive
95/46/EC to the smart card
manufacturer
(a) The qualification of the smart card
manufacturer as a data controller 
In principle, the following reasoning can be
brought forward:
■ The Smart Card Serial Number embedded in
the smart card is a personal data from the
moment somebody is able to identify the card
holder, i.e., a data subject. This unique number
is used notably for identifying the card and is
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deemed to be linked to information concerning
an identified or identifiable person.14
■ The mere storage of the SSN can be considered
a processing activity.15 In addition it must be
underscored that the  retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination
or otherwise making available are also
considered as processing activities.
■ Considering that a data controller is the person
determining the purposes and the means of
data processing,16 one can defend that a smart
card manufacturer is a data controller, to the
extent that the latter has determined the
purpose and the technical means of use of the
SSN, i.e., a unique identifier.
■ By virtue of article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC,
the controller “has to implement technical
measures to protect personal data against
unauthorised disclosure or access, in particular
where the processing involves the transmission
of data over a network”.17
■ The mere fact that other persons, e.g., the
application providers, can read the unprotected
SSN without great difficulties and therefore use
it for other purposes is a major privacy issue. 
In this view, the mere fact that each smart card
scheme application provider has an unrestricted
access to the unique SSN could be considered as
infringing article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that this
viewpoint can be criticised for multiple reasons.
In the first place, one has to consider that
during the smart card’s development or production
phase, the SSN does not yet relate to any natural
living person. Some authors defend an
interpretation in concreto of the notion of
personal data.  According to this interpretation
only data concerning an identified living natural
person can be considered as personal data. In
contrast, following an interpretation in abstracto,
the identifying number can be considered as
personal data in the meaning of Directive
95/46/EC because a theoretical possibility of
identification exists.18
From the beginning on, the smart card is
designated to be distributed to the public. Upon
reception of the smart card, this card, including
the embedded SSN, can be linked to the card
holder, i.e., a living natural person. From that
moment on, the SSN will no longer be an
anonymous number, but will, beyond any
discussion, be considered as personal data. In
consequence the principles of Directive 95/46/EC
have to be considered. Moreover, the initial and
final purpose of the use of a SSN is to identify the
person holding the card, e.g., to inform him that
his card is defective. Furthermore, it should be
underlined that it is not required that the smart
card manufacturer has to identify the card holder.
By virtue of recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC the
data controller or any other person, e.g., the card
holder’s financial  institution, can use all
reasonable means to identify the data subject.  
In the second place, the qualification of the
smart card manufacturer as a data controller is
criticised. From a certain point of view, the smart
card manufacturer only develops a technology and
will offer that technology to application providers,
e.g. a financial institution. The application
provider will then use the technology for its
particular purpose and will determine the
purposes and means of its processing activities.
Such a qualification, however, does not exclude the
qualification of the smart card manufacturer as
the controller of the information it puts on the
smart cards. Indeed, it is the card manufacturer
who initially takes the decision to implement a
unique identifier in its cards, the purposes, e.g., for
security reasons, and how this unique identifier
operates. For this reason, one should make a clear
distinction between the activities carried out by the
application providers and those of the smart card
manufacturer. In relation to each of those
activities, one has to analyse the role each of the
actors has. Based upon this analysis a qualification
as data controller or processor can be given and
the individual responsibilities of the persons
involved can be defined.19
Considering that the qualification of data
controller depends on the capacity to determine
the purposes and means of data processing,20 e.g.,
identification of dysfunctional cards, it can be
defended that the smart card manufacturer is
considered as data controller in relation to the
unique identifiers such as the SSN. 
(b) The qualification of the smart card
manufacturer as a data processor 
In some circumstances, the application provider
will request that the smart card it intends to
purchase, should meet certain functional and
technical requirements, e.g., that they can be
identified. In this hypothesis, the smart card
manufacturer will give a unique identifying
number to each smart card on behalf of the
application provider, i.e., the data controller. 
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Therefore, the smart card manufacturer can be
considered as the data processor,21 processing
personal data on behalf of the data controller. In
this regard, the following remarks can be made:
In the first place, it will be the data controller’s
obligation to comply with the requirements
imposed by Directive 95/46/EC, e.g., to inform the
data subject and to notify its processing activities.22
From the smart card manufacturer’s viewpoint the
qualification as a data processor is less draconic. 
Secondly, the data controller will have an
overall responsibility for the processing activities of
its data processor. In this view, the controller and
data processor, i.e., the smart card manufacturer
will have to execute a contract or other binding
legal act. In this contract it will be stipulated,
amongst others, that the data processor will have
to provide for sufficient guarantees to prevent any
unauthorized disclosure or access to personal data,
including the identifying card number.23
Therefore, it will be the prime responsibility of
the application providers to evaluate the different
smart card technologies at hand and choose the
one that offers sufficient guarantees in the field of
data protection. In addition, it must be emphasised
that the personal data processed by a controller or
on behalf of the controller are adequate, relevant
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and further processed. For
these two reasons, it can be argued that the data
controller has a strong interest - even is obliged  -
to choose processors with the least privacy
threatening technology. 
(c) Preliminary conclusions
In light of the forgoing it can be argued that:
■ Each application provider is the controller of
the processing activities performed in its
application;
■ This qualification does not interfere with any
qualification of the smart card manufacturer; 
■ The smart card manufacturer determines the
purposes and means of use of the unique
identifier, this irrespective of any further use,
e.g., as a global unique identifier for cross-
profiling purposes; 
■ If on request of an application provider, the
smart card manufacturer develops smart cards
with a unique identifier, the latter can be
considered as a data processor;
■ In application of article 17 of Directive
95/46/EC, all data controllers must adopt
appropriate technical and organizational
measures to protect personal data against
unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized
access. Furthermore, they must make sure that
their data processors are bound by similar
obligations. 
Eventually and irrespective of the qualification
as data controller or data processor, it must be
said that personal data may only be processed for
specific, explicit and legitimate purposes and may
not be processed in a way incompatible with these
initial purposes.24 From this standpoint, if each
smart card has a unique identifier, its use is subject
and limited to certain purposes. On the one hand,
this implies that if there are no specific and
explicit purposes for the use of a unique card
identifier, it may not be used and it should be
removed from the card. On the other hand, if a
specific, explicit and legitimate purpose is present,
someone has to determine them, which means that
the latter is the data controller, who has to comply
with the requirements of article 17. In addition,
the use of GUI must be proportional to the
objective pursued. In this light, the adoption of
less privacy-killing technologies can be advocated. 
Nevertheless one weak spot in this reasoning
remains: Is the smart card manufacturer really
processing personal data? Although the notion of
“processing” encompasses many activities,25 at the
moment the unique identifier is embedded in the
smart card, it does not (yet) relate to an
identifiable natural person. In other words, is
Directive 95/46/EC only applicable to the
processing of personal data, which seems to imply
that both constitutive elements, i.e., i) a processing
activity and ii) personal data, should be
simultaneously present? In this view an argument
could be found in the exact wording of article 2
(b). It is stated that processing is “any operation or
set of operations which is performed upon
personal data”. According to this definition, one
can argue that the registration of anonymous data
cannot, ab initio, be considered as a processing
activity. 
In the situation at hand, it is evident that, at
first glance, the smart card manufacturer is only
recording or storing anonymous data on the smart
card. Afterwards, when linked to personal
information of the card holder, these anonymous
data will become personal data. Therefore, even if
the unique identifier can be linked to a data
subject, at the moment the smart card
manufacturer stores the identifier on the smart
card, this identifier is an anonymous data. By
Multi application smart card schemes
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definition, the action undertaken by the card
manufacturer cannot be considered as a processing
activity for the mere reason that its activity was
not performed upon personal data. Accordingly,
the smart card manufacturer cannot be qualified
as a data controller or processor. 
Nevertheless, two arguments can be developed
to counter this point of view. On the one hand and
by virtue of recital 26, anonymous data are
information from “which identification of the data
subject is no longer possible”.26 In this regard,
anonymous data should be considered as only
those data that cannot identify the data subject,
not now and not in the future. In this light the
question remains: can data be considered as
anonymous in the strict meaning of recital 26,
when they  are intended to identify a data subject,
i.e., the card holder? 
Based upon section 3(6) of the Federal German
Data Protection Act,27 the following information
can be considered as anonymous data: all
information concerning personal or material
circumstances that no longer, or only with a
disproportionate amount of time, expense and
labour, can be attributed to an identified or
identifiable individual.  Considering the proper
function of a GUI, i.e., to identify people, it seems
difficult to sustain that the smart card holder can
only be identified with a disproportionate amount
of time, expense and labour. A similar reasoning
can be made for cookies. In most of the
hypotheses, cookies are meant to identify a person
and his web navigating preferences, e.g., the
language in which a site has to be displayed.28
On the other hand, one must refer to the
higher legal grounds on which Directive 95/46/EC
was adopted and to which it specifically refers. In
its recital 10 it is clearly stated that:
The object of the national laws on the
processing of personal data is to protect
fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the
right to privacy, which is recognized both in
Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and in the general principles of
Community law. 
Article 8 guarantees the protection of private
and family life, and interference is subject to strict
conditions, i.e. in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society to protect certain
fundamental interests. Therefore, even if the
qualification of the smart card manufacturer is not
without problems, one has to consider the more
universal right to privacy. Even if the actions
undertaken by the smart card manufacturer do not
enter the field of application of Directive
95/46/EC, the unconditional and widespread use of
GUI could be considered as an unlawful
interference with one’s private life.29 In addition,
Directive 95/46/EC is contemplated by other legal
European instruments that can offer an alternative
ground to foster the development of less privacy-
killing technologies.
2. The application of Directive
99/05/EC to the smart card
manufacturer
Such an alternative could be offered by Directive
99/5/EC on radio and telecommunications
terminal equipment.30 Its article 2 defines terminal
equipment as:
A product enabling communication or a
relevant component thereof, which is intended to
be connected directly or indirectly by any means
whatsoever to interfaces of public
telecommunications networks.31
The same Directive grants the European
Commission the competence to decide, according
to the procedure set out in article 15,32 that an
apparatus shall be so constructed that it
incorporates safeguards to ensure that the personal
data and privacy of the user or the subscriber are
protected.33 In application of article 2(a) of
Directive 99/5/EC apparatus means any equipment
that is either radio equipment or
telecommunications terminal equipment or both.
In this regard, there is in our view no reason for
considering this Directive as not applicable to a
multi-application smart card scheme, in particular
to the hardware used therein.34 35
Furthermore, similar provisions have been
prescribed in Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and
electronic communications.36 According to its
recital 46 and article 14, measures may be adopted
to ensure that terminal equipment is constructed
in a way that is compatible with the right of users
to protect and control the use of their personal
data. In recital 26 it is stated that:
Directive 95/46/EC covers any form of processing
of personal data regardless of the technology used.
The existence of specific rules for electronic
communications services alongside general rules for
other components necessary for the provision of
such services may not facilitate the protection of









personal data and privacy in a technologically
neutral way. It may therefore be necessary to adopt
measures requiring manufacturers of certain types
of equipment used for electronic communications
services, e.g., smart card manufacturers, to construct
their product in such a way as to incorporate
safeguards to ensure that the personal data
and privacy of the user and subscriber are
protected. The adoption of such measures in
accordance with Directive 1999/5/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March
1999 on radio equipment and telecommunications
terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of
their conformity will ensure that the introduction of
technical features of electronic communication
equipment including software for data protection
purposes is harmonised in order to be compatible
with the implementation of the internal market.
In contrast to the application of Directive
95/46/EC to a smart card manufacturer, the
application of Directive 99/05/EC is not a concern.
However, one bottleneck remains. To convince smart
card manufactures to develop less privacy threatening
products, e.g., conditional access to the unique smart
card identifier, an initiative of the European
Commission is required.  In relation hereto, reference
can be made to the legal framework for the so-called
Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies. In
recital 57 of Directive 2001/29/EC on copyright in the
information society,37 it is stated that manufactures
of
these technical means, in their technical
functions, should incorporate privacy safeguards in
accordance with Directive 95/46/EC. 
How less privacy-threatening smart cards can
be manufactured without substantially reducing
the opportunities offered by a multi-application
smart card scheme will be demonstrated in the
second part of this article. 
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13 Article 29 WP, Opinion 7/2000 On the European
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